I think that was because we are in 2 different generations of controls. One control that been use a long time. One control that only been used for a few years. So the old farts don't know how to use it, and the newbies somewhat do. Then we have the that somehow did and crashed a ship into another ship.
And you're a qualified USN watchkeeper?
You must be, to be able to pinpoint the core problem so succinctly!
I can only rely on my own experience. Any time I've been on the bridge of a USN warship the helmsman was young, sometimes a teenager. They weren't used to any control system other than the one fitted to their ship, new or old.
According to the official report, the 'newbies' weren't any more or less proficient than anyone else. The system was overly complex and had additional features the bridge team were not trained in using, but which were very easy to inadvertently activate. During the collision the bridge team were transferring control of multiple systems from one station to another (helm to lee helm). Their understanding and drills were based around use of the primary steering position (helm), but various settings were changed automatically as control was passed between the positions. This isn't 'old farts' not being able to use the kit, it's the 'newbies' being completely unaware of the consequences of their actions while carrying out the 'old fart's' orders. Add in yet more automation in the Ship Control Centre (the engine room) and the vessel quickly became virtually unnavigable. The crew took action based on an incorrect assumption that they had suffered a malfunction, adding to the confusion and altering the automated control system's responses still further. One particularly crucial event was the shafts' GUI indicating 'ganged', meaning both propellors were turning at the same speed. In that state the helmsman expected both propellors to reduce revolutions when he reduced the port shaft revs to make 10 knots. Instead, the starboard shaft kept spinning at it's previous rate, forcing the ship into a hard turn as her speed weighed off.
There's a lot more to it, but this isn't a question of old versus new controls, it's a case of ridiculously complex solutions versus very simple requirements. A warship's controls don't have to be any more complicated than a speedboat's and if they are, then the system is badly designed.
The USN have sensibly decided to refit bloody big levers and a wheel because there is no room in such a system for multiple software changes on the fly to destroy control of the ship. The lever is either forward or aft, there's no Schrodinger's throttle control going on! Fitting extremely clever, hi-tech gadgets in place of tried, tested, safe and reliable ones was a really stupid move, one that cost ten sailors their lives. I'm glad that the Navy have seen sense and are acting so quickly. Hopefully nothing like this will happen again...
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