That's the problem here. You are trying to use a purely semantic argument that is devoid of any real meaning. As an essential part of my job I deal with medicolegal issues that rely on both precise wording and are also held to a very real standard of intent in terms of how that is being applied. For example, if I am treating a patient who has been certified under the Mental Health Act for psychiatric reasons it's not enough for me to simply argue some technicality about what I might personally consider to be a "delusion" based entirely on some semantic argument. Even if that argument might have theoretical technical merit the review panel is going to question it in detail and I have to defend it not only on a theoretical but also a practical basis. If I have applied a purely semantic argument that is devoid of reasonable meaning and intent then the certification will be overturned. I'm referring here to very significant medicolegal issues here that relate to literally suspending a patient's rights against unlawful detention and confinement in a medical facility. I need to make a medicolegal argument that both follows the precise wording used in legislation and also has both clinical and practical merit as part of my job.
I honestly have no use or respect for a purely semantic argument because the standard I am required to apply in my own work requires arguments that have a far higher basis that goes beyond simple technicalities or semantics. It sounds like your experience with legal arguments is not held to that same standard, and if that is the case, I understand why you are tying to make such an argument but it is not anywhere near the standard that my own work is routinely held to.
Your role is constrained doubly (presumably) by the twin boundaries of medical ethics and a legislative framework which ultimately gives you the power to restrict individual's freedom if deemed necessary for the benefit of the patient.
Mine is concerned with the application of UK taxation law, which sets precise boundaries relating to the taxation treatment of income and is regularly tested via tax tribunals, all the way to the Appeal Courts.
I wouldn't say there's any doubt at all that your work requires higher standards than mine, mainly because I happen to think that the rights (and wellbeing) of the individual in a medical context are far more important than anything I'm involved in. I do think my work is important but let's not dress it up - there are
far more important things than money.
I would however say that on the face of things, my own work would seem to be a far more immediately analogous environment to commercial contract law than yours and that's ultimately what we're discussing here; whether the agreement that people entered into with FDev is or is not being met.
The detail
is critical and it doesn't really matter how distasteful you may find that; the issues really do boil down to what clause A of section 7, chapter 3 say and so on because that is how a judgement of whether a contract has been delivered or not is ultimately made. As I said, you can't talk about a contact not being delivered and then dismiss discussing the detail of it as a semantic argument that has no meaning, it's a bloody contract! Its
entire purpose is to specify conditions.
